TTSB Released the Final Report on the Collision Involving TRC Diesel-Electric Locomotive No. R169 and a Stationary Train During Shunting at Hualien Depot

The Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) has released the final report on the collision involving Taiwan Railway Corporation, Ltd. (TRC) diesel-electric locomotive No. R169 and a stationary train during shunting operations at Hualien Depot.

On April 20, 2025, at Hualien Depot of TRC, an R150 type diesel-electric locomotive, No. R169, collided with a stationary EMU3000 New Tze-Chiang train while attempting to couple with the train stabled on track No. 2. The occurrence caused damage to the coupler and nose cone of the EMU3000 train. No injuries were reported.

In accordance with the Transportation Occurrences Investigation Act, Taiwan., and the definition of major transportation occurrences specified therein, the Taiwan Transportation Safety Board was the independent agency in charge of investigating the railway accident. The agencies (institutions) invited to participate in the investigation include Railway Bureau of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications（MOTC）, and TRC.

After comprehensive investigation and analysis of the factual data, a total of 8 findings and 4 safety recommendations were obtained. This investigation report was reviewed and approved in the 83th board meeting of the TTSB on February 13, 2026 and released on March 25, 2026.

Findings

Findings Related to Probable Causes

1. As the shunting locomotive approached the "Stop and Proceed" sign, the shunter signaled the driver to stop by waving a red flag. However, the driver did not stop as instructed and continued moving toward the stationary train. After realizing that the driver had not responded to the stop signal, the shunter was unable to stop the locomotive directly because no such equipment was available at the shunter's position. Although the shunter continued waving the signal flag, this did not effectively draw the driver's attention in time to stop. Consequently, the shunting locomotive collided with the stationary train at a speed of 12 km/h.

Findings Related to Risks

1. TRC's shunting signaling system relies on visual warnings, which may increase the driver's visual workload and reduce the effectiveness of timely alerts. In emergency situations, the use of auditory warnings would be more likely to ensure that alerts are effectively conveyed under varying operational conditions.
2. TRC's standard operating procedures for shunting do not explicitly specify that, in emergency situations, the shunter may use the radio to warn the driver to stop. This limitation makes it more difficult to prevent collisions resulting from a driver not complying with stop instructions.
3. TRC did not promptly repair or replace damaged or fallen "Stop and Proceed" signs, which made it more difficult for both the shunter and the driver to determine the appropriate stopping position and required braking distance.
4. At Hualien Depot, TRC conducted shunting operations with the Automatic Train Protection system of the shunting locomotive switched off. As a result, when the locomotive operated between Hualien Station and Hualien Depot, there was an increased risk of passing a stop signal and colliding with other trains.

Other Findings

1. TRC did not properly inspect and maintain the malfunctioning onboard video recording system of the shunting locomotive, thereby limiting the availability of video records that could have assisted in clarifying the causes of the occurrence.
2. TRC experienced several shunting-related safety occurrences within a short period, most of which were associated with personnel not following standard operating procedures.
3. The investigation determined that adverse weather, inadequate personnel qualifications, alcohol use, and malfunction of the shunting locomotive were not contributing factors in this occurrence.

Transportation Safety Recommendations

To the Taiwan Railway Corporation, Ltd.

1. Evaluate and implement more effective means for shunters, in emergency situations, to warn drivers or otherwise bring the shunting locomotive to an immediate stop.
2. Repair or replace damaged or fallen "Stop and Proceed" signs.
3. Re-evaluate the safety and appropriateness of conducting shunting operations at Hualien Depot with the locomotive's Automatic Train Protection system switched off.

To the Railway Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications

1. In exercising its regulatory oversight responsibilities, incorporate into regular or ad hoc inspection items the safety recommendation issued to TRC concerning the repair or replacement of damaged or fallen "Stop and Proceed" signs.

The full investigation report is available on the TTSB website

https://www.ttsb.gov.tw/1243/22450/40802/post

Ya-Ting Chang, Director

Secretariat Office

Tel: +886-2-7727-6210

E-mail: [email protected]

Steven Wu, Director/Chief Investigator

Railway Occurrence Investigation Division

Tel: +886-2-7727-6260

E-mail: stevenwu @ttsb.gov.tw