EU Statement – 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Main Committee I

EU Statement - 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Main Committee I

30 April 2026, New York - European Union Statement for Main Committee I at the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (27 April - 22 May 2026)

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries Montenegro, Albania*, the Republic of Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Monaco and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

1. Congratulations on your role as Chair of Main Committee I.

2. The EU reiterates its support for all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the NPT and for a comprehensive, balanced, and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. We stress the urgent need to implement all obligations under the NPT and commitments made during the previous Review Conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. The EU notes the very severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

4. The EU reaffirms its unwavering commitment to advance nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, especially through the overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, and taking into account the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

5. Recalling the obligations for all nuclear weapon States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, the EU strongly encourages seeking further reductions to their nuclear arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. The EU notes the expiry of the New START Treaty. The EU calls for urgent work towards a new agreement on a legally binding framework limiting the largest nuclear arsenals and encourages the United States and Russia to maintain in the meantime the agreed limits on their nuclear arsenals. We urge Russia to engage meaningfully, and call on China to contribute and engage actively and constructively.

6. The EU condemns in the strongest possible way Russia's actions, its nuclear rhetoric and its threats to use nuclear force in its war of aggression against Ukraine, which are irresponsible, provocative, dangerous and escalatory. The latest update of Russia's nuclear doctrine, aimed mostly at coercing and deterring further support to Ukraine, no longer includes "compliance with international arms control obligations" among the principles of Russia's deterrence policy. We are deeply concerned about Russia's announced deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus, and recall Belarus' commitment under the Budapest Memorandum 'to eliminate all nuclear weapons from [its] territory', and call on both countries to reverse this decision.

7. We categorically oppose the deployment of nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction in outer space as well as their development for this purpose. Their deployment would constitute a severe and wide-reaching breach of international law, including the Outer Space Treaty. We also call on all States to refrain from the development of such weapons specifically designed for this purpose.

8. The EU remains deeply concerned about China's rapid, andopaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is inconsistent with its disarmament commitments under the NPT. Its lack of transparency about its doctrine, policies and expanding arsenal raises serious doubts about the credibility of its 'No First Use' policy, and fuels mistrust. We encourage China, holder of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, to engage in risk reduction and arms control, including by enhancing transparency, establishing necessary communication lines to prevent misperceptions, and clarifying its strategic objectives.

9. The EU strongly encourages nuclear-weapon States to pursue discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction and verification, laying the ground for the negotiation of robust future arms control agreements and reporting. While not a substitute for nuclear disarmament, concrete risk reduction contributes to the prevention of nuclear war, can play a major role in creating trust, confidence and predictability, and complements disarmament and arms control efforts.

10. As highlighted in the working paper submitted jointly with a number of NPT States Parties, the EU stresses the need to promote universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTBT. Recent allegations about nuclear tests, statements of the resumption on nuclear testing, as well as Russia's unprecedented decision to revoke its ratification, make it all the more urgent to bring the CTBT into force. To this end, the EU calls on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or delay. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any nuclear explosion and to refrain from conducting any action contrary to its object and purpose.

11. The EU calls for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) and calls for the immediate launch of negotiations on an FMCT on the basis of document CD/1299. Pending the entry into force of such an FMCT, the EU calls on China, the only nuclear-weapon State not to have done so, and any other States concerned, to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. The EU underscores the value of multilateral cooperation in advancing nuclear disarmament verification to facilitate progress on nuclear disarmament. The EU, reiterate its support for the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and other similar formats, and advocating constructive engagement on establishing a UN Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

13. With regard to the development of new emerging technologies, and in particular artificial intelligence, the EU underlines the importance of maintaining human control over decisions to use nuclear weapons. The EU welcomes recent progress in this regard, including the commitment made by France, the United States and the United Kingdom to maintain human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment, as well as a bilateral commitment in this regard between the United States and China. The Council calls on Russia and other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow suit.

14. The EU recognises the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances are important components of binding and agreed security arrangements, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contributing to confidence-building and nuclear disarmament, and enhancing regional and global security.

15. Finally, the EU reiterates its support for disarmament and non-proliferation education, to which the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium is contributing through various activities, and for the participation of young people in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

16. ^Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.