IAEA Board of Governors on the JCPoA, September 2025: E3 Statement

Chair,

On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom - the E3 - I thank Director General Grossi for his latest report on Iran's nuclear programme, including his update this morning, and look forward to having more information about these elements and their impact. We commend the Agency's professional, independent and impartial work providing objective reporting on Iran's nuclear programme and its implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under UN Security Council resolution 2231.

The report points out that in June 2025, a number of Iran's nuclear facilities were the target of military attacks. We have been clear that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were not involved.

The report highlights that Iran's nuclear escalation has reached unprecedented levels, in stark violation of the commitments Iran freely agreed to in 2015. As of 13 June 2025, Iran's overall enriched uranium stockpile was 48 times the JCPoA limit; Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent had further increased to more than 440 kg and Iran now has more than ten IAEA "significant quantities" of highly enriched uranium. As a reminder, a "significant quantity" is the approximate amount required, as defined by the IAEA, of material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.

As the IAEA has repeatedly stated, Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons that has enriched uranium to this level. There is no credible justification for a civilian purpose for this level of enrichment, which creates serious concerns about Iran's true intent.

It should be of utmost concern to all members of this Board that Iran's entire enriched uranium stockpile has been unaccounted for since mid-June. As a result of Iran's non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments over the past years, the Agency had already lost, as reported on numerous occasions, the continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC. The DG has now reported that the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge with regard to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran.

We are also very concerned that following Iran's letter of 12 June 2025 informing the Agency that it "intends to establish a new enrichment facility named as Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant" and due to Iran's refusal to readmit inspectors, the IAEA has not been able to inspect this new facility and cannot even say whether or not it has been built. As a reminder, under the JCPoA, Iran committed that all uranium enrichment activities would take place solely at Natanz.

Chair,

To put it bluntly, there up to this moment near zero IAEA oversight of Iran's nuclear programme, and there are thousands of kilos of enriched uranium in Iran which the IAEA has not been able to verify for nearly three months. Iran is obfuscating the status and location of this material from the international community, and Iran refused to allow the Agency to verify this stockpile.

The E3 are grateful to the IAEA for its account of events that unfolded after 13 June, and for the assessment of damages reported. However, it should be noted that the picture will remain incomplete for as long as the Agency is not granted full access to all nuclear facilities, including those that were targeted by the strikes.

Iran has also not taken the necessary steps to resume implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement for nearly three months, despite repeated requests by the Director General and the IAEA, who have expressed willingness to consider Iran's concerns. Instead, Iran has adopted a law suspending cooperation with the Agency, an unacceptable step which clearly contradicts Iran's NPT obligations. Iran's safeguards agreement contains provisions for the implementation of safeguards under special circumstances and the IAEA is well equipped to conduct its work in difficult conditions. We echo the Director General's call on Iran to conclude its discussions with the Agency to enable the full resumption of inspections without delay.

We note in this regard the DG's opening remark, and await reporting regarding new practical arrangements. It is critical that full IAEA monitoring and verification is urgently restored to enable the international community to understand the nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Chair,

Iran is, and has been since 2019, in clear and consistent non-performance of its JCPoA commitments. For years there would have been sufficient legal grounds for the E3 to trigger the so-called "snapback" mechanism. The E3 have worked tirelessly over many years to avoid this and to reach a diplomatic solution. We made every effort to bring Iran back into compliance, including by using the JCPoA's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, which the E3 activated on 14 January 2020. In 2020 and 2021 we engaged in months of talks with the aim of fully restoring the JCPoA, and that would have returned the United States to the deal. Instead, Iran chose to reject two offers put on the table by the JCPoA coordinator in 2022 and to further expand its nuclear activities in clear breach of its JCPoA commitments.

In July this year, the E3 offered Iran a limited, one-time snapback extension provided that it agreed to resume direct and unconditional negotiations with the US, return to compliance with its legally-binding safeguards obligations, and address its highly enriched uranium stockpile. These measures were fair and achievable and sought to restore full IAEA oversight of Iran's nuclear programme - a condition necessary for restoring a serious and enduring diplomatic process. Iran has decided not to take up this offer.

This is why we were left with no choice but to trigger the snapback mechanism on 28 August, as provided for under UNSCR 2231. We have always been clear that we cannot allow the Iran nuclear issue to be removed from the UNSC agenda and UN sanctions to be permanently lifted, when Iran's nuclear programme has advanced to unprecedented levels and Iran is not meaningfully engaging in diplomacy and not complying with its legal safeguards obligations.

We are at a critical juncture. It has been almost two weeks since the notification to the Security Council triggering snapback, which initiated a 30-day window before the reimposition of previously suspended resolutions. The E3 have been clear to Iran and the international community that we remain committed to diplomacy. It is now up to Iran to quickly take concrete steps to demonstrate it is serious about finding a diplomatic solution and to engage meaningfully with our offer, which will remain on the table during the 30-day window before snapback takes effect.

It is not enough for Iran to make promises for tomorrow, we need to see evidence from Iran today that demonstrates it is ready for a diplomatic solution that addresses the international community's concerns. That starts by showing, not claiming, that it is meeting the fair and reasonable conditions set by the E3 for a Snapback extension, which would help create the environment for a full and enduring agreement.

We firmly believe that this Board must send a united message on the urgent need for Iran to restore full IAEA access to urgently address proliferation concerns, as well as to stress the importance of upholding its NPT Safeguards Agreement and restoring the IAEA's critical verification role.

We ask the Director General to keep the Board informed of all relevant activities and developments relating to Iran's nuclear programme by regular and, if necessary, extraordinary reporting, and as for this report to be made public.

Thank you.