Wagner – Africa Corps Transition in the Central African Republic: A Three-Body Problem

• Commentary Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia
  by Charles Bouëssel
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Since 2023, the paramilitary group's African operations have been gradually absorbed into a structure under more direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defence: Africa Corps. Only one country continues to resist this transition: the Central African Republic (CAR). Wagner is so deeply entrenched there that it has, so far, maintained its position despite mounting pressure from Russian authorities. Moscow has avoided open confrontation with Wagner but is increasingly frustrated by the reluctance of the Central African authorities.

For several months, Russia has sought to impose the deployment of Africa Corps in CAR and secure Wagner's departure. Orders have been issued. Senior Russian military officers and Africa Corps emissaries have travelled repeatedly to the country and established a permanent presence, notably through Denis Pavlov, supported by staff at the Russian embassy in Bangui. Relations between Pavlov and Wagner, however, remain strained. Communication is cautious and difficult, as Wagner refuses to transfer its operations, particularly its knowledge of rebel leaders, terrain dynamics and the informal security architecture it has built over recent years. Above all, Wagner intends to remain, with the backing of the Central African authorities. Its leaders in Bangui fear being sidelined or even arrested if they return to Russia, and losing their financial assets in the country. As a result, Africa Corps' presence remains embryonic, limited to a handful of advisers, and largely non-operational, while Wagner continues to operate as before.

This is the first time such tensions have slowed the transition from Wagner to Africa Corps. Elsewhere, like in Mali, the shift has occurred quietly. The process has mainly aimed to replace personnel loyal to Prigozhin (who died in a plane crash after his 2023 mutiny), absorb remaining structures and minimally formalise Russia's military presence on the continent in order to preserve its influence. Beyond the change of name, methods remain largely unchanged. Wagner's paramilitaries - and now those of Africa Corps - are deployed under defence agreements signed with Russia. Like Wagner, Africa Corps benefits from strong backing by the Russian military and intelligence services (GRU) and operates in coordination with the Kremlin. The main difference is institutional: Africa Corps maintains closer ties with Russian diplomatic missions and openly acknowledges its allegiance to the Ministry of Defence, whereas Wagner denied such links, giving it greater freedom of action.

The deadlock stems from Wagner's outsized influence over the Central African authorities. Since 2018, its advisers have had direct access to the president and shaped defence policy and security sector reform. They have played a central role in rebuilding the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), training thousands of soldiers and delivering weapons. Their role extends far beyond training. Wagner ensures presidential security and participates directly in combat operations against rebel groups. During the 2021 electoral crisis, it enabled the army to repel a rebel offensive on Bangui and subsequently helped recapture most major cities. It also supports FACA's air capabilities, notably by refurbishing and piloting attack helicopters, and provides technical intelligence critical to protecting the president and detecting threats. These measures helped stabilise the country from 2021 onwards and provided crucial protection for the regime.

Wagner's paramilitaries also support the authorities politically. Their negotiations with armed groups, alongside military operations, facilitated the signing in 2019, and subsequent survival, of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, still the main framework for stability in CAR. Wagner has also been involved in the removal of the National Assembly president in 2018, the creation of a pro-government militia ("Requins") in 2019, the adoption of a constitution weakening institutional checks in 2023, attempts to introduce a "foreign agents" law modelled on Russia's in 2024, and electoral manipulation. Its leaders in Bangui, Dmitry Syty and Dmitry Podolsky (aka Salem), have developed detailed knowledge of political actors and rebel leaders - expertise that could be lost if they depart. Syty, in particular, has built a relationship of trust with President Touadéra over nearly nine years.

Despite its central role in the security apparatus, Wagner has a relatively limited impact on public finances, an important factor in a country facing recurrent cash flow crises. The group is largely funded in kind through companies operating in mining, forestry, brewing and other sectors. These activities are opaque, contribute little to taxation and often rely on highly coercive methods resembling predation. Yet the Central African treasury contributes only €2.5 million per month, a modest sum compared to estimated operating costs exceeding €15 million.

This level of influence creates dependency, limiting the authorities' room for manoeuvre despite pressure from Moscow. They fear that Wagner's departure would degrade military and political support. At the same time, they are wary of opposing the group, which has forced their hand on several occasions, notably by undermining efforts to improve relations with Western partners. Some members of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra's inner circle have even raised the possibility of his overthrow should he defy Wagner. Whether credible or not, such threats weigh on decision-making.

Financial considerations further explain Bangui's reluctance. Africa Corps would impose a far heavier burden on public finances, at a time when the state struggles to meet basic expenditures such as civil servants' salaries. Unlike Wagner, it shows little interest in in-kind compensation and reportedly demands close to €14 million per month, roughly one-third of the state's annual budget. Moscow, for its part, appears unwilling to commit significant resources to a country it still considers of limited strategic importance. Recent support has been modest, limited to in-kind donations such as wheat and fuel, alongside diplomatic backing at the UN Security Council.

Three scenarios emerge, each carrying distinct risks:

• Full replacement
  This could entail a loss of both security and political expertise, reducing operational effectiveness in the short term. It may weaken Russia's defensive posture and encourage rebel repositioning. Diplomatic relations would likely endure, though Bangui's trust in Moscow could erode. At the same time, CAR might gain greater latitude to diversify partnerships. Africa Corps' closer ties to the Kremlin could also translate into more formal, less coercive engagement with the authorities.

• Merger or coexistence
  This could generate internal frictions that undermine operations in the short term, especially if roles and hierarchies remain unclear. However, it would preserve Wagner's operational expertise and limit any medium-term loss of effectiveness. This scenario offers the most balanced outcome between maintaining operational capacity and preserving relations with Russia.
• Continued blockage of Africa Corps' deployment
  In the short term, CAR would continue to benefit from Wagner's support without disruption. Over time, however, this could irritate Moscow and gradually erode Russian backing. While Russia has so far managed the issue discreetly, weakening Wagner without open confrontation, it may tolerate the group only as long as it remains useful, while limiting further investment. In the longer run, CAR risks losing Russian support, while Wagner's ability to operate without state backing remains uncertain. Deprived of Russian human, material and logistical support, it is unlikely to sustain its current level of effectiveness.