CITING CORE NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC REASONS, SCHUMER DEMANDS APPLE REJECT CHINESE MILITARY-LINKED CHIPS

Schumer Leads Bipartisan Push To Apple CEO Tim Cook Urging Company Not To Use Chinese Memory Chips, Which Would Undermine American Workers And The Nation's Growing Domestic Memory Chip Industry - Including In Central NY

Schumer Warns Apple Purchasing Chinese-Made Memory Chips Would Hurt America's National Security And Shape Memory Chip Market By Setting Dangerous Example For Other Companies To Follow

Schumer To Apple: Don't Undermine American Workers, Manufacturing, And National Security By Using Chinese Military-Linked Memory Chips

Today, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer led a bipartisan group of Senate colleagues calling on Apple CEO Tim Cook to commit that no memory chips produced by Chinese military-linked companies ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) or Yangtze Memory Technologies Co (YMTC) will be used in any Apple product sold anywhere in the world. Schumer explained that communities across Upstate New York, including Central New York, are growing centers for some of the country's most advanced chip manufacturing, and that this would hurt the nation's domestic semiconductor supply chain by setting a dangerous precedent for other companies to follow.

"Using Chinese-made chips produced by companies allied with the Chinese Communist Party regime undermines American manufacturing and national security," said Schumer. Schumer also demanded answers about Apple's reported testing of Chinese memory chips and its alleged efforts to lobby the Trump administration against national security restrictions on Chinese semiconductor suppliers.

"Fueled by investment from my Chips & Science Law, workers in Central New York and across the country are carrying out the largest domestic expansion of domestic memory chip production in a generation, and American companies, like Apple, should be buying chips stamped 'Made in America,' not from companies linked to the Chinese military," said Senator Schumer. "I wrote my CHIPS & Science Law, so we would make American microchips again, with American workers, and not be over-reliant on semiconductors from overseas. That's why I'm leading a bipartisan group of senators calling on Apple CEO Tim Cook to commit to not using memory chips produced by Chinese military-linked companies. I've long sounded the alarm on the grave national security and economic threats posed by YMTC, CMXT, and other companies backed by the Chinese Communist Party. Apple integrating these Chinese chips into its supply chain would send a dangerous message to other American companies that they, too, should turn to Chinese-made chips. This, despite the real national security concerns and how the CCP is actively trying to undermine American chip manufacturing companies by propping up Chinese companies like CXMT and YMTC, I will always fight to protect Upstate New York's growing semiconductor superhighway, which is key to our economy and national security."

In the letter, Schumer and colleagues warn that the Department of Defense has designated both CXMT and YMTC as Chinese military companies and that federal law already requires the U.S. government to phase products containing their semiconductors out of federal procurement, a law that exists after a Schumer-led effort to include this requirement in the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act. The senators argue that Apple's adoption of Chinese memory chips for use anywhere in its supply chain would undermine American semiconductor manufacturing, strengthen Beijing's military-industrial base, and send a market signal that could steer the global technology industry toward suppliers the U.S. government has identified as national security threats.

Schumer has long fought to stop the growth of Chinese chipmakers with ties to the Chinese Communist Party and its military ambitions that threaten U.S. national security. In addition to his successful inclusion of a provision in the FY2023 NDAA to remove Chinese-made chips from the defense supply chain, Schumer also successfully advocated in 2022 for the Biden administration to add YMTC and dozens of other Chinese companies to a trade blacklist, restricting U.S. exports of advanced U.S. technology that could be used by these companies to advance the Chinese Communist Party's military and economic agenda. Also in 2022, Schumer joined bipartisan colleagues to push the Biden administration to stop Apple from a previous consideration of integrating Chinese-made chips into their supply chain. For years, Schumer has also been actively pushing to add CXMT to the Commerce Department's Entity List, which already includes YMTC after Schumer's advocacy.

Schumer is also co-lead of the bipartisan Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act, which would modernize U.S. export controls to ensure adversaries cannot buy "chokepoint" semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) technology from the United States or our partners. Among many actions, this bill would place tighter restrictions on all fabs run by CXMT, YMTC, and other Chinese firms of concern, cutting off access to critical semiconductor manufacturing tools. Schumer is actively working to include the MATCH Act in this year's NDAA bill.

Schumer and colleagues' letter to Apple can be found HERE or below:

Dear Mr. Cook:

We write to express our concern regarding credible reports that Apple has begun testing DRAM from ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) for potential use in devices and is allegedly lobbying U.S. federal officials against national security controls to permit the broader use of Chinese memory chips in Apple products. This short-sighted move would be a mistake, and it would ensure the world's most valuable consumer-electronics company grows dependent on critical supplies from a firm the United States government has formally designated as a Chinese military company. We urge Apple to abandon any effort to incorporate memory from CXMT, Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC), or any other Chinese state-backed supplier into any of its products.

The U.S. government has been clear that both CXMT and YMTC present significant national security threats. The Department of Defense designated both CXMT and YMTC as Chinese military companies under Section 1260H, and both remain on the list the Department updated last month. The Bureau of Industry and Security identified YMTC as a national security threat when it added the company to the Entity List in 2022. State-owned shareholders held over 35 percent of CXMT before its planned Shanghai listing, and CXMT moved into profit only after the global memory chip shortage took hold, after it ran heavy losses in earlier years that were sustained by state capital. Beijing has run this same playbook in countless critical supply chains before including steel, batteries, and shipbuilding, where state-subsidized capacity drove prices below market levels, forced trusted Western producers out of business, and made buyers dependent on America's chief adversary for vital goods.

Congress has also weighed in on the national security risks posed by CXMT and YMTC. Section 5949 of the FY 2023 NDAA barred federal agencies from acquiring products that use CXMT and YMTC semiconductors beginning in December 2027. If Apple pursues Chinese memory chips in its devices, it would be directly supporting a supply chain the U.S. government is legally bound to phase out of its devices.

As the most demanding component buyer in the world, a decision by Apple to procure Chinese memory chips would carry weight well beyond the company's own purchase orders. This validation would function as a signal that other buyers follow. That signal would arrive just as workers in Indiana, Idaho, New York, and Virginia carry out the largest expansion of domestic memory production in a generation, including the advanced packaging plant SK Hynix is building alongside Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana.

Analysis indicates that CXMT's pricing is currently, in some cases, higher than that of global competitors, and CXMT has recently hiked prices on its existing customers. Even if Apple were able to negotiate lower initial pricing from CXMT, this does not justify the national security exposure that Apple would create by qualifying or integrating chips from a designated Chinese military supplier into its products. That exposure should weigh far more heavily on the company than any short-lived savings a supply arrangement might promise.

The limitation that CXMT memory would, for the moment, be confined to devices sold in China cannot be expected to hold, because once a part clears qualification for Apple production, extending it worldwide is a single procurement decision away. The revenue and reputational gains enjoyed by CXMT would hold regardless of where the finished device is eventually sold. Apple confronted a version of this very choice in 2022, when it evaluated YMTC NAND for the iPhone and, after congressional scrutiny, thought better of it.

Accordingly, we request your responses to the following by August 21, 2026:

1. Will Apple commit that it will not incorporate CXMT or YMTC memory into any Apple product, whether sold in the United States or abroad? If not, please explain why.
2. Please describe the current status of Apple's testing or qualification of memory from CXMT, YMTC, and any other Chinese supplier, including which product lines and memory types, whether DRAM, NAND, or HBM, are involved.
3. What information about Apple's products, technical specifications, or product roadmaps has Apple shared, or would it share, with CXMT, YMTC, or their representatives in the course of qualification?
4. Has Apple assessed whether memory from CXMT or YMTC relies on the intellectual property of United States or allied memory manufacturers, including whether those Chinese suppliers are licensed to the relevant patents, and what legal or supply exposure that would create for Apple's products?
5. Under a hypothetical procurement agreement, what access, if any, would CXMT, YMTC, or their personnel have to Apple's design, production, or supplier-management facilities in connection with this memory, and what data would that memory or those personnel be able to collect?
6. During the current shortage, has Apple asked any United States or allied memory manufacturer for additional supply, increased allocation, or priority over other customers, and what was the result?
7. Has Apple conducted any analysis of the supply chain security risks associated with sourcing memory from CXMT, YMTC, or other Chinese suppliers, including the risk of dependency on supply that could be restricted, controlled, disrupted, or terminated by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China? If so, please describe that analysis and its conclusions.

The precedent Apple would set by addressing the memory shortage this way would shape the memory market and this country's security for years after supply has returned to normal, and we urge you to weigh that carefully before the company commits itself any further. We look forward to your response.

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