Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Together on Iran, Divided on Regional Geopolitics

• Commentary Middle East and North Africa
  by Eleonora Ardemagni
• whatsapp

Prioritising Gulf stability, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are on the same page regarding de-escalation efforts between the US and Iran to prevent a military attack against Tehran amid protests. At the same time, Saudi-Emirati political tensions have heightened especially in Yemen, Somalia and Sudan, given divergent geopolitical interests. In this context, Saudi Arabia is working to establish multiple defence pacts or military alliances to deter Israel's military offensives in the region (with Pakistan and, likely, Turkey), and to compete with the Emirati influence in the Horn of Africa (with Egypt and Somalia), while the UAE cultivates a connectivity and security partnership with India and Israel. Regarding the Saudi-Emirati rivalry, the pacts led by Riyadh resemblemore ad hoc alliances of interest, rather than to fixed blocs: Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt - and the rest of the Gulf monarchies - look interested in advancing cooperation and business with Abu Dhabi, despite geopolitical disagreements.

Phone diplomacy: Gulf monarchies row together on Iran

The Gulf monarchies have rowed in the same direction to defuse the US-Iran crisis ignited by the Iranian protests, succeeding - at least for the moment - to stop the Donald Trump's use of force option in Tehran. Qatar, Oman and especially Saudi Arabia have been at the forefront of Arab de-escalation efforts, with Riyadh directly informing Tehran it wouldn't allow its territory and airspace to be used for strikes against Iran. Also the UAE joined Gulf monarchies' 'phone diplomacy' with Iran, as Tehran warned it would have retaliated on US' Gulf bases in case of American attack.

For Riyadh and the Gulf monarchies, stakes are too high. They can regionally capitalise on a weakened Iran, as it has been occurring after the October 7^th, but not on a destabilised one: Gulf stability is fundamental for monarchies' border control, economic Visions, maritime and energy security. After Iran's attack against Al Udeid base in Qatar (June 2025), Doha has gained written security guarantees from Washington, and now appears the most protected monarchy by the US. Conversely, Saudi Arabia hasn't received American written security guarantees in case of an external attack, even though Riyadh had word on it before crown prince MbS' visit to the White House (November 2025). In case of a new war involving Tehran, this means that Saudi Arabia would still be highly exposed to Iran's retaliation.

The Saudi-Pakistan-(Turkey?) pact: deterring Israel

Instead, Riyadh is working by itself to build stronger defence alliances with countries external to the Gulf. A few days later Israel's strike on Hamas in Doha (September 2025), Saudi Arabia and Pakistan formalised a mutual defence pact, stating that "any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both". Turkey may join the pact soon, or a military alliance with Riyadh and Islamabad which is separate from the Saudi-Pakistani deal, according to Islamabad's defence production minister.

Saudi Arabia elevated long-standing military relations with Pakistan to complement US' decreasing Gulf deterrence, and to contain Israel's rising military assertiveness in the Middle East. Allowing Turkey to join that format now, or a less binding military alliance, would have the same strategic rationale, with Ankara eying to also deter Israel's military activity in Syria. The expansion of the Saudi-Pakistan pact to Ankara would further reshape the power equation in the Gulf, with a second non-Arab power entering the Gulf security chessboard.

The Saudi-Emirati rift: diverging interests in the Red Sea and in the East Med

As Gulf security balances are evolving, Saudi Arabia and UAE's diverging geopolitical interests in Yemen, Somalia and Sudan have reached now a breaking point, with Yemeni Southern regions as the powder keg. According to media reports, Saudi Arabia would be finalising a military alliance with Egypt and Somalia: curbing the Emirati influence in the Red Sea region would be the main reason. Saudis' and the Emiratis' interests look different also in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In late December 2025, Riyadh perceived territorial gains in eastern Yemen by the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), close to its border, as a national security threat, similarly to Oman's reaction. Therefore, Riyadh pushed the STC - and UAE's remaining military personnel - to withdraw from Southern regions under a significant display of force.

In Somalia, Israel's recognition of Somaliland as an independent state in December 2025 was rejected by the Saudis, and has engendered a strong reaction by Mogadishu, who cancelled bilateral agreements with Abu Dhabi, even though it's still unclear whether the Somali government can enforce its decision since ports and security deals mainly regard pro-Emirati autonomous regions. The UAE hasn't recognised the Somaliland state, but cultivates strong economic, infrastructural and military agreements with the separatist region.

In Sudan, repeated allegations by the Sudanese government of UAE's military support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), denied by the Emiratis while considered "credible" by UN experts, are now causing tensions with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, who backs the Sudanese army, would be the funder of an 1,5 billion dollars, close to be finalised, to provide Pakistan's aircraft and drones to the army of Sudan to better counter the RSF. In these standoffs, most of the Gulf monarchies publicly aligned with Saudi Arabia, as Turkey and Egypt also did. Bahrain stands in the middle as the Gulf monarchy closest to Saudi Arabia for security and economic reasons, but part of the Abraham Accords.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the plan for a trilateral military alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus, signed in Nicosia in December 2025, sees Riyadh and Abu Dhabi opposed again. Although both the Saudis and the Emiratis have intensified cooperation with Greece and Cyprus in latest years, the UAE looks more favourable to this alliance. Visiting Nicosia for the first time in December 2025, the Emirati president Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan strengthened the strategic partnership with Cyprus, which already includes military cooperation. To complete the picture, the UAE is part of the Abraham Accords and has an economic participation in the Israeli Tamar offshore gas field. Conversely, Saudi Arabia prioritises a more cautious and balanced approach to the area: the trilateral military alliance is in fact perceived by Turkey as a potential game-changer for defence status quo and procurement in the East Med.

Saudi-led 'anti-UAE' frameworks are alliances of interest, not blocs

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia's political initiatives in the Gulf and in the Middle East focus on complementing the decreased American external protection, on containing Israel's rising military assertiveness and, to a lesser extent, on curbing the Emirati influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Except for the military operation in Yemen, Riyadh is investing in alliance-making to reshape geopolitical balances.

Regarding the UAE, Saudi pushes for building formats of 'like-minded' states on regional issues, for instance the suggested Saudi-Egypt-Somalia military alliance, is going to intensify geopolitical competition with the Emiratis. At the same time, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan's growing cooperation with Riyadh is not likely to affect their bilateral relations with Abu Dhabi: despite some regional disagreements, Cairo, Ankara and Islamabad have an interest in preserving good relations with the UAE.

Egypt, which has just concluded agreements to develop Assab (Eritrea) and Doraleh (Djibouti) ports to gain military access, opposes Ethiopia's maritime ambitions through Somaliland, thus conflicting with UAE's position. However, it seems highly improbable that Cairo reconsiders Emirati investments in Egypt now, starting from the 35 billion dollars deal signed with the UAE in 2024 to develop the Ras El-Hikma peninsula, the largest foreign direct investment in the history of the country. Furthermore, Egypt and the UAE are in final talks for the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), with the latest meeting held in late December.

Things are similar for Turkish-Emirati and Pakistani-Emirati cooperation. Since the 2022 rapprochement, Turkey's bilateral relations with the UAE have rapidly deepened, with Emirati investments in Ankara exceeding 6 billion dollars as of 2025, driven by the CEPA, and now expanding towards defence industry cooperation. For Pakistan, which is in advanced talks for signing a CEPA with Abu Dhabi, the UAE represents a long-time ally, precious for budget security and balances in Southern Asia.

Connectivity and defence: the UAE-Israel-India strategic partnership

The UAE has shaped a strategic partnership centred on Israel and, most of all, India. The alliance shares growing security interests, from economic and infrastructural cooperation to maritime security. The UAE is part of the Abraham Accords; at the same time, Abu Dhabi made clear to Tel Aviv its red line on the West Bank's annexation by Israel, also showing a diplomacy-driven approach to the Iran threat. India and Israel recently signed a deal to deepen defence, technology and industry collaboration.

At a bilateral level, the UAE-India's Letter of Intent towards a Strategic Defence Partnership, signed during Mohammed bin Zayed's visit in in New Delhi on 19 January, the third in less than four years, makes clear that Abu Dhabi considers India its strategic best friend amid regional and international uncertainties.

At global level, both the UAE and India are US' major defence partners, a unique status allowing unprecedented military cooperation between involved armed forces. The UAE, India and Israel are also part of the Washington-backed West Asia Quad (i2u2) which, however, seems to have lost momentum since the Gaza war, as Abu Dhabi searches to minimise public engagement with Tel Aviv not to hurt internal public opinion. The UAE and India are also part of the Trilateral Cooperation Initiative with France, and the Emirati-Indian segment is the backbone of the IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

Whither Gulf security, and relations?

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Gulf stability stands at the top of strategic interests: only a safe Gulf can allow economic prosperity, attractiveness and diversification. This implies shared efforts on preventing a US-Iran escalation, or to defuse - from different perspectives - Israel's military offensives in the region. Between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, geopolitical rivalry has now reached a boiling point, especially in the Red Sea-Horn area: Saudi Arabia's pro-status quo stance coalesces more political support in Arab, Middle Eastern and African countries, than the Emirati strategy.

However, emerging Saudi-led coalitions involving Middle Eastern, African and South Asian states look closer to alliances of interest, not at blocs, with the Emiratis keeping a consistent clout in bilateral relations. The deepening of UAE-India defence cooperation further contributes to strengthen Gulf security. For this reason, whatever pact Abu Dhabi and New Delhi should sign in the future would complement - and not counter - the Saudi-Pakistan deal, adding another piece to a new Gulf security mosaic where the US is still the dominant, but no longer the exclusive power.