Bank of England

11/19/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/19/2026 04:07

Effective practices: Cyber risk and resilience management relating to quantum computing

This publication is issued jointly by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Bank of England (the Bank) (collectively, the regulators). Where it refers to 'we', 'us', or 'our', this means the regulators collectively. In this publication, 'firm' is used in the same way it is used in our supervisory statement (SS) and Final Guidance (FG) (throughout 'SS/FG') on cyber risk and resilience management and includes financial market infrastructures (FMIs).

1.1 This publication highlights effective practices that firms can adopt to manage risks to their cyber resilience relating to quantum computing.

1.2 The effective practices are complementary to, but separate from, our SS/FG on cyber risk and resilience management.footnote [1] They are, however, not part of the regulators' formal expectations.

1.3 The effective practices build on relevant publications by the regulators, HM Treasury, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), non-UK authorities, international standard-setting bodies, and industry. They have also been informed by our engagement with firms.

1.4 The regulators' expectations in the cyber risk and resilience management SS/FG apply regardless of the technology firms use. The effective practices address quantum-related cyber risks in greater detail.

1.5 Quantum computing poses significant risks to the cryptographic methods that currently underpin cybersecurity in the financial sector. However, managing these risks involves more than adopting new cryptographic algorithms. Effective preparation involves firms identifying and prioritising cryptographic dependencies and vulnerabilities across their technology estates, understanding which systems need to be upgraded or replaced, and managing risks arising from dependencies on third-party suppliers, service providers and other connected organisations. Migration also involves carrying out timely remedial work without weakening operational resilience and retaining the flexibility to respond as threats and standards evolve.

1.6 The effective practices are intended to be used proportionately. Firms can adopt the practices in a manner appropriate to their size, complexity and risk profile.



2.1 A sufficiently capable quantum computer would be able to solve certain mathematical problems that classical computers cannot solve in practice. While this could create significant opportunities, including for innovation in the financial sector, it also creates new risks and sources of cyber threat. In particular, it could undermine the public-key cryptography widely used to protect financial transactions, communications, records and other data, and to support authentication and digital signatures. A quantum computer capable of doing this is known as a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC).

2.2 At present, no CRQCs are known to exist. While there is considerable uncertainty about when CRQCs will be developed, there is a strong case for firms to start to address quantum-related cyber risks.footnote [2] There are several reasons:

  • It will take time and concerted effort for firms to prepare for CRQCs by migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC): ie cryptographic methods that are designed to be secure against both quantum computers and classical computers. The later a firm begins preparing, the greater the likelihood that its transactions, communications and assets will remain exposed when the technology matures and the quantum threat materialises;
  • Threat actors may adopt a 'harvest now, decrypt later' (HNDL) strategy. They could obtain encrypted data now, with the intention of decrypting it with quantum technology in the future. For example, confidential customer or transaction data intercepted today may still be sensitive when a CRQC becomes available, exposing it to later disclosure; and
  • The pace of technological development in quantum computing may change unexpectedly, resulting in more capable quantum computers arriving earlier than anticipated. Firms may therefore consider a range of plausible timelines, rather than relying on a single forecast when planning how to manage quantum-related cyber risks.

2.3 The following sections describe effective practices that firms may consider when managing quantum-related cyber risk.



3.1 Boards and senior management need to consider the implications of quantum computing for their firm's cyber risk and resilience. Preparing to move to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) may involve a complex, multi-year programme of work across the firm and its third parties. To meet this challenge, steps a firm's board and senior management can take include:

  • setting the programme's strategic direction;
  • agreeing a documented migration plan with clear milestones and dates; and
  • considering the financial and non-financial resources needed for implementation, including expertise, technology and investment over the expected duration of the transition.

3.2 Firms may also need to consider reflecting quantum computing readiness in relevant strategic, risk management and investment decisions.

3.3 Cyber resilience against these risks involves more than migrating to PQC. It also involves understanding and managing these risks as the technology evolves. It is therefore important for firms to consider how to keep their board and senior management informed about relevant developments in quantum technology, cryptography, third-party quantum readiness, and quantum-related cyber risks. This may include sharing the latest guidance from relevant authorities and updating the firm's strategy and migration plan where appropriate. Another important consideration is involving relevant business functions, alongside technology and security teams, when identifying critical systems, services and dependencies and planning their migration.

3.4 Effective oversight includes clearly assigning responsibility for managing quantum-related cyber risk to individuals with appropriate authority and skills and integrating this risk into existing governance and risk management arrangements. Firms may support this with education and training for key staff on quantum risks and how to manage them, including the board, senior management and senior technical staff and control functions.

3.5 Firms can support effective board oversight by providing their board with clear, accurate, useful and timely management information (MI) on their quantum readiness and progress against their migration plan. This may include progress in developing the cryptographic inventory (see section 4), the identification of priority systems and services, third-party readiness and how quantum-related and migration risks relate to the firm's risk appetite.



4.1 Effective practice involves a firm identifying the cryptographic methods and assets used across its cyber and information and communications technology (ICT) estate, including those used to protect data at rest and in transit, authenticate users and systems and create or verify digital signatures. This includes cryptography used in:

  • applications;
  • databases;
  • application programming interfaces;
  • certificates;
  • public key infrastructure (PKI);
  • authentication mechanisms;
  • backups;
  • networks; and
  • operational technology.

4.2 Identifying dependencies on third-party systems and services is also key. Maintaining an accurate and up-to-date inventory of these methods, assets and dependencies (a 'cryptographic inventory') can help the firm assess risks and plan its migration to PQC.

4.3 To effectively analyse its quantum-related cyber risks, a firm may need to:

  • determine whether, and to what extent, the methods identified in its cryptographic inventory are vulnerable to risks from quantum computing, including the implications for confidentiality, authentication and the integrity of digitally signed information;
  • identify data that are vulnerable to HNDL attacks, taking into account the sensitivity of the data, its potential value to a threat actor, and the period for which it needs to remain confidential; and
  • assess dependencies on third parties that provide cryptographic functionality, products or services, including their readiness to support PQC and whether their migration plans and timelines are compatible with the firm's own.

4.4 The firm may also consider prioritising vulnerabilities for remediation or upgrade, taking into account:

  • the sensitivity and required protection lifetime of the relevant data;
  • how critical the relevant systems and services are;
  • any constraints from legacy systems; and
  • how long the changes will take to implement.

4.5 The firm may use its cryptographic inventory and the results of its risk analysis to develop and implement an adaptable, risk-based, proportionate and well-prioritised migration plan covering relevant applications, infrastructure, networks, hardware, data and third-party dependencies. The plan may set out the firm's migration priorities, sequencing, milestones and target dates. In doing so, the firm may identify systems and assets that may not support quantum-resistant cryptography, including relevant legacy applications, hardware, devices and operational technology. It may consider whether these can be upgraded or need to be replaced, retired or otherwise managed.

4.6 The firm can consider the latest relevant guidance on migration timelines, including any published by the NCSC and the regulators, which may change in response to the evolving threat landscape.



5.1 A firm may implement its migration plan by progressively introducing quantum-resistant methods and controls across its cyber and ICT estate. The firm may adopt a phased approach, giving priority to data that is critical or of long-term sensitivity and to systems and services whose disruption could have a material impact on the firm, its customers or the wider financial sector. Firms can draw on established PQC standards and relevant authoritative guidance when selecting migration approaches.

5.2 The firm may consider building cryptographic agility ('crypto-agility') into its systems and assets: the capability to flexibly adapt and/or replace cryptographic algorithms as threats, technologies and standards evolve. Individual PQC algorithms may no longer provide effective security as the field develops. It will therefore be important for firms to consider how to adapt to maintain cyber resilience over time. Firms may consider the potential need to change cryptographic algorithms when they design, develop, buy or upgrade systems.

5.3 As firms migrate, following effective practices can be helpful when managing ICT change at each stage of their migration. This may include assessing and managing the risk that new cryptographic methods or transitional arrangements introduce vulnerabilities or otherwise weaken the security, resilience, performance or availability of systems and services. Where appropriate, firms may co-ordinate implementation with relevant third parties.

5.4 Where a system or asset cannot be upgraded to support PQC, considerations include the firm replacing, retiring or otherwise managing it, taking a risk-based approach and considering the potential short- and long-term consequences of leaving vulnerabilities unaddressed. The firm may do this in accordance with its established ICT change controls, taking account of the potential effects on the security, availability and resilience of affected systems and services.

5.5 The firm can also consider hybrid solutions, which combine traditional algorithms with PQC algorithms. For example, these may help mitigate the risk of HNDL attacks. In line with NCSC guidance, firms may treat hybrid arrangements as an interim measure, while progressing towards a PQC-only end state.footnote [3] Where traditional and quantum-resistant cryptographic methods are used together during the transition, the firm may assess the security, operational and implementation risks involved.



6.1 A firm may need to test changes made as part of its migration plan to assess whether they work and achieve the intended cyber risk management and resilience outcomes. This may include testing whether quantum-resistant methods and controls:

  • operate as intended;
  • remain effective under realistic operating conditions; and
  • interact securely with the firm's other systems and services.

6.2 The firm may also test its arrangements for managing changes that fail or have unintended consequences. This may include, where relevant, testing its ability to reverse changes safely and checking that systems do not unintentionally revert to cryptographic methods that are vulnerable to CRQCs. The firm may use the lessons from this testing to update its migration plan and controls where necessary.

6.3 A firm may need to consider how its response and recovery arrangements would apply if cryptographic protections were compromised or if migration activity disrupted an important business service. This may include assessing whether its arrangements enable it to:

  • contain the impact effectively;
  • re-establish trusted authentication, communications, digital signatures and data protections; and
  • maintain or recover affected services within applicable impact tolerances.

6.4 Migration planning includes identifying third parties whose products or services are relevant to the firm's use of cryptography or migration to PQC. Firms may seek information about the preparedness and migration plans of material third parties. Differences in their capabilities, technical approaches and timelines may affect firms' own migration and levels of quantum-related cyber risk.

6.5 To support migration, the firm may need to review and, where appropriate, update its procurement processes and contractual arrangements with material third parties about:

  • their cryptographic dependencies;
  • their readiness for PQC; and
  • relevant changes to their products or services that could affect the firm.

6.6 The firm remains accountable for managing quantum-related cyber risk where the relevant systems or services are provided by a third party.

6.7 Some aspects of migration may require firms, third parties and other connected organisations to act in a coordinated way. Where this is the case, a firm may work with relevant third parties, counterparties, financial market infrastructures, common service providers and established industry forums to:

  • support compatible approaches to planning, testing and implementation; and
  • manage dependencies that it cannot address alone.

6.8 For internationally active firms, this may include considering differences in the standards, technical approaches and migration timelines adopted across jurisdictions.

6.9 Firms may monitor the effectiveness of their quantum-resistant controls and progress against migration plans. It is also important that firms update controls, assurance activities and approaches to migration as quantum-related threats, cryptographic standards, authoritative guidance and the preparedness of third parties evolve.

6.10 Management of quantum-related cyber risk is an ongoing activity, rather than a one-off migration exercise. Effective practice is likely to involve firms:

  • keeping their assessment of quantum-related risk and their cryptographic inventory current;
  • monitoring relevant technological, threat, standards and third-party developments; and
  • updating their strategy, controls and migration approach where appropriate.


Bank of England published this content on November 19, 2026, and is solely responsible for the information contained herein. Distributed via Public Technologies (PUBT), unedited and unaltered, on November 19, 2026 at 10:07 UTC. If you believe the information included in the content is inaccurate or outdated and requires editing or removal, please contact us at [email protected]