Leaving Myanmar: Why Europe still matters

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Ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci was the European Union's Head of Delegation in Burma/Myanmar from 2020 - 2025.

As I return to Europe after almost five years in Myanmar, I find myself reflecting on the country I first encountered and the one I left behind. When I arrived, there was cautious optimism: reforms were taking hold, trade with Europe was expanding, and opportunities were opening up for millions. Today, after four years of military rule, the mood is one of exhaustion and despair. Armed conflict and a controversial conscription law have shattered the economy, driven millions into poverty, and forced a generation of young people to flee. Reports from the Thai border speak of families having to make impossible choices about which child to send away, not for education, but simply for survival.

Amid such despair, even small signs of international engagement take on heightened significance. The continued presence of European businesses, civil society groups, and diplomats is one of the few lifelines left for Myanmar's people and one of the few signals that the outside world has not abandoned them. For many, the EU's engagement is more than symbolic: it sustains livelihoods, protects activists, and keeps alive the hope of a different future.

The EU's presence is not a cure for Myanmar's turmoil, but for many inside the country it is one of the few forms of solidarity they can still count on. At the same time, Brussels faces an important dilemma: it cannot solve the crisis, but it cannot afford to disengage either. To step back would not only betray Myanmar's people; it would weaken ASEAN, hand China greater influence, and expose the limits of the EU's ambitions in the region. The challenge for Brussels is to stay engaged in ways that matter on the ground while still remaining credible as a strategic actor.

The debate over the EU's role is deeply polarised. Those who remain in Myanmar often welcome European engagement. Those who fled after the 2021 coup often see it differently. Both sides oppose the junta, but they diverge on strategy. Many exiled activists argue that by maintaining engagement, the EU has failed to isolate the regime and that only sweeping sanctions can bring change. But Myanmar has been down this road before. Sanctions in the 1990s and 2000s devastated civil society and small businesses while leaving the generals largely untouched. Without support from Myanmar's neighbours, broad Western sanctions today would risk repeating that mistake: punishing ordinary citizens while the military leadership carries on.

Geography compounds this dilemma. Myanmar's neighbours, including ASEAN states, continue to engage with, and in some cases support, the junta. This reality sharply dilutes Western leverage. Europe cannot wish away Myanmar's location, and any effective policy must account for these regional realities, however frustrating.

Even within these limits, the EU's engagement has mattered. The two pillars of European engagement, supporting inclusive processes to restore democracy and peace and standing by Myanmar's citizens, remain sound. But it is essential to temper expectations and recognise both the limits and the real leverage of European action. Before the coup, European trade and development initiatives created roughly 100 000 jobs each year and improved access to education. Since 2021, the continuation of these programmes has helped cushion some of the socio-economic shock.

In this context, sanctions cannot be treated as a cure-all. The military's businesses - the intended targets of these sanctions - remain largely insulated, while trade preferences help sustain vulnerable groups, especially rural women. Despite persistent accusations that EU aid flows through junta institutions, not a single euro reaches the regime. Assistance goes directly to millions of people, including labour activists and human rights defenders. But this is compounded by Myanmar's polarised information environment which makes communication risky and fosters a culture of self-censorship where organisations deliberately keep a low profile in order to protect their staff and operations. This silence is sometimes mistaken for complicity, but in reality, it is what allows them to keep working. Quiet engagement - including back-channel diplomacy - has also delivered tangible results, from prisoner releases to improved worker protections to the suspension of executions. Maintaining the space for such engagement is critical for those on the ground.

Beyond perception, there are also harder realities at stake. Why should policymakers in Brussels care about a country so far away? Because Myanmar's crisis reverberates far beyond its borders. The collapse of the rule of law has fuelled illicit economies, making Myanmar a hub for synthetic drugs and online scam centres that generate billions in revenue, exploit trafficked individuals, and harm millions worldwide. Strategically, Myanmar offers China a corridor to bypass the Malacca Strait, enhancing Beijing's influence. Many in Myanmar resist over-dependence on China, but their options are narrowing. And the coup has weakened ASEAN, undermining its credibility as a bloc and complicating Europe's strategy of working through regional partners.

For Europe, Myanmar is more than a humanitarian concern. It is a test of the EU's credibility. Europe's continued engagement is essential: it signals to Myanmar's people that they are not forgotten and to Asia that the EU's ambition to be a serious global actor is real. Back-channel diplomacy, as politically unpalatable as it may sometimes be, has already shown it can secure concessions. Broad sanctions, by contrast, would punish the most vulnerable, making difficult lives even harder.

We have read this story before. The priority now is ensuring that Europe's economic, political and societal presence continues so that the EU remains relevant for the people of Myanmar. When I first arrived in Myanmar, Europe mattered. As I return to Europe now, the question is whether it continues to matter.

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