Unpacking Iran’s Drone Campaign in the Gulf: Early Lessons for Future Drone Warfare

Unpacking Iran's Drone Campaign in the Gulf: Early Lessons for Future Drone Warfare

Photo: alones/Adobe Stock

Beyond the systems already described, one particularly interesting case suggests the possible involvement of Russian-produced loitering munitions in Iran's strike campaign. Open-source analysis of drone debris and video footage from the UAE indicates that a Geran-2 drone, a Russian-produced variant derived from the Iranian Shahed-136, may have been used during the March 2026 retaliation.

Serial markings suggest the system originated from the Kupol plant in Izhevsk, rather than Iran's domestic production lines, and incorporated Russian modifications such as the Kometa-M jam-resistant navigation system. The presence of a Russian-manufactured Geran-2 in Iran's operations would suggest that the previously one-directional drone cooperation, where Iran supplied Shahed systems to Russia after 2022, may be evolving into a more reciprocal exchange of loitering munition technologies between the two countries.

Implications for U.S. Military Counter-Drone Strategy and Lessons from Ukraine

This analysis reinforces that countering mass drone attacks cannot rely primarily on traditional air defense missiles. Ukraine's experience shows why. Interceptor drones have become a core layer of air defense because they are cheap enough to use at scale, preserve high-end interceptors for cruise and ballistic missiles, and can be produced in large numbers. Ukrainian officials state that the country produced over 100,000 in 2025 and that the combat success rates of these platforms exceed 60 percent. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence also reported deliveries approaching 950 anti-Shahed interceptors per day in December 2025.

For the U.S. military, the lesson is straightforward-drone defense must begin with a cheap, numerous, drone-against-drone layer rather than with a force structure built around million-dollar missiles.

However, hardware alone does not constitute a real advantage. The decisive factor lies in the broader operational infrastructure that integrates drones into a coherent defensive ecosystem. This ecosystem consists of the following components:

1. Cheap mass-produced drone interceptors: Drone-against-drone warfare is becoming a core element of modern air defense. Ukraine's experience shows that countering large waves of one-way attack drones cannot rely on high-end interceptors alone; it requires systems that can be deployed at scale. Ukrainian forces increasingly use low-cost interceptor drones to counter Shahed-type loitering munitions because they are inexpensive, scalable, and effective over large areas. Unlike traditional interceptors, such as the Patriot missile, which cost around $4 million per shot, interceptor drones used in Ukraine typically cost $2,000 to $4,000, allowing threats to be engaged at a fraction of the cost. The key lesson is that defending against mass drone attacks requires mass on the defensive side as well, meaning the U.S. military must field large numbers of cheap interceptor drones as a first defensive layer.
2. Integration into doctrine and multilayered air defense: Hardware alone does not determine effectiveness. Ukraine's success stems from integrating interceptor drones into a layered defensive architecture alongside traditional air defense systems, electronic warfare, and mobile ground teams. Drones are assigned to intercept low-cost threats, preserving high-end systems such as Patriot interceptors for cruise and ballistic missiles. The U.S. military should similarly incorporate drone interceptors into doctrine, command structures, and operational planning rather than treating them as ad hoc solutions.
3. Trained operators and dedicated counter-drone units: Another key factor is personnel. Ukraine's counter-drone effectiveness depends on large numbers of trained operators organized into specialized units responsible for detecting, tracking, and engaging aerial threats. This requires dedicated training pipelines, standardized tactics, and constant exercises that simulate large-scale drone attacks. For the United States, building a counter-drone force will require not just technology procurement but also training programs and unit structures designed specifically for drone defense missions.
4. Sensor fusion and battle management software: Modern counter-drone operations rely heavily on software that integrates radar, acoustic sensors, optical systems, and other inputs into a single operational picture. Ukrainian systems such as Delta illustrate the importance of sensor fusion and flight management software that allows operators to detect, assign, and prosecute targets quickly. Without such systems, even large numbers of interceptor drones cannot be effectively coordinated. The U.S. military therefore needs advanced sensor fusion and battle management platforms that connect sensors, interceptors, and command nodes.
5. Resilient communications: Drone defense networks must function in environments where GPS is degraded and communications are contested. Ukraine's experience shows the importance of resilient data links, decentralized control, and systems capable of operating even when communications are disrupted. For U.S. forces operating in contested theaters, counter-drone architecture must be designed with redundant communications pathways and degraded-mode capabilities.
6. Onboard AI for detection, engagement, and swarming: AI increasingly enables drones to operate effectively in complex and contested environments. Onboard AI allows interceptor drones to recognize targets, filter sensor data, and navigate despite jamming or degraded navigation signals. It also enables coordinated swarming behavior, allowing multiple drones to share targeting data, distribute tasks, and engage large numbers of incoming threats simultaneously. Rather than pursuing autonomy as an abstract concept, the U.S. military should prioritize AI functions that enhance survivability, targeting accuracy, and operator efficiency while enabling coordinated drone swarms capable of countering mass drone attacks.
7. Continuous iteration and rapid updates: Perhaps the most important lesson from Ukraine is the speed of adaptation. Drone warfare evolves rapidly, with new countermeasures and modifications appearing constantly. Effective counter-drone systems therefore require continuous iteration of hardware, software, tactics, and training. The U.S. military should establish mechanisms that enable rapid updates and operational feedback loops, ensuring that counter-drone capabilities evolve at the same pace as the threats they are designed to defeat.
   

Conclusion

The first week of Iran's retaliation campaign during Operation Epic Fury shows that drones are no longer auxiliary systems but central instruments of modern air campaigns. Their ability to sustain pressure at relatively low cost allows actors to impose economic, psychological, and operational strain while preserving higher-end missiles for select targets. The effectiveness of such campaigns depends not only on the drones themselves but on the broader ecosystem that enables their use at scale, including production capacity, doctrine, and integration with other strike systems.

For the United States, adapting to this environment requires more than acquiring new hardware. It demands integrating drones and counter-UAS capabilities into doctrine, training, procurement, and operational planning. Building an effective defense against mass drone warfare will require coordinated development of interceptor drones, sensor networks, battle management software, resilient communications, and trained operators capable of operating in increasingly AI-enabled battlespaces.

Kateryna Bondar is a fellow with the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.