Ranking Member Shaheen Opening Remarks at Hearing on Sabotage in the Baltic Sea, Implications for European Security and Lessons for the Indo-Pacific

WASHINGTON - Today, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing, "Sabotage in the Baltic Sea, Implications for European Security and Lessons for the Indo-Pacific." In her remarks, Ranking Member Shaheen criticized the failure of the Trump Administration to impose needed sanctions in response to Russia's broader hybrid war campaign, including its intentional cutting of subsea cables by its shadow fleet.

You can watch her opening remarks here.

"Last winter, damage to a telecommunications cable between Finland and Estonia was detected," said Ranking Member Shaheen. "Finnish authorities looked at maritime traffic in the area and found one ship stood out. It was a cargo ship dragging its anchor, and it was from St. Petersburg, Russia. I'm sure that comes as no surprise to either of you. They seized the boat, gathered evidence and opened a criminal investigation, but as we know, it wasn't an isolated incident. As the Chairman has said, multiple undersea cables in the Baltic were cut this year, each time involving civilian vessels. This is a strategy being carried out by Russia's shadow fleet and by other adversaries of the United States."

Ranking Member Shaheen emphasized the need for the United States to take action to protect against and counter the targeting of critical infrastructure.

"At a moment when pressure should be increasing, the signal from the U.S. is mixed," said Ranking Member Shaheen. "Ships keep moving, revenue keeps flowing and Russia keeps pushing the boundaries. This allows Russia to sustain its war in Ukraine and these activities in the Baltic. The infrastructure targeted in the Baltic is not unique to Europe. Similar vulnerabilities exist in the Indo-Pacific, including around Taiwan as we saw from our visit there in April."

Finally, Ranking Member Shaheen highlighted the national security implications of these attacks to mostly privately-owned infrastructure.

"I would like to enter a statement from SubCom-a U.S. company based in New Hampshire that builds and maintains undersea cables-as well as a report from the International Connectivity Coalition for the record," said Ranking Member Shaheen. "As we know, much of this infrastructure is privately owned and unevenly protected. Repair capacity is limited, and it takes time to fix breaks. So, attribution for attacks still takes weeks, and even then, intent is hard to prove. So, we need to recognize that that infrastructure is national security."

The Ranking Member's remarks, as delivered, are below.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our witnesses. Thank you both for being here today.

Last winter, damage to a telecommunications cable between Finland and Estonia was detected. Finnish authorities looked at maritime traffic in the area and found one ship stood out. It was a cargo ship dragging its anchor, and it was from St. Petersburg, Russia. I'm sure that comes as no surprise to either of you. They seized the boat, gathered evidence and opened a criminal investigation, but as we know, it wasn't an isolated incident. As the Chairman has said, multiple undersea cables in the Baltic were cut this year, each time involving civilian vessels. This is a strategy being carried out by Russia's shadow fleet and by other adversaries of the United States.

And it extends beyond the Baltic, to undersea cables near the United Kingdom and oil and gas installations in the North Sea. Putin is testing a model of conflict.

The question is: Are U.S. sanctions keeping pace with how Russia is operating? In my view, they are not keeping pace, and Russia is exploiting that gap. Russia continues to generate billions through its shadow fleet, exploiting gaps between U.S., European and U.K. enforcement.

At a moment when pressure should be increasing, the signal from the U.S. is mixed. Ships keep moving, revenue keeps flowing and Russia keeps pushing the boundaries. This allows Russia to sustain its war in Ukraine and these kinds of activities in the Baltic.

The infrastructure targeted in the Baltic is not unique to Europe. Similar vulnerabilities exist in the Indo-Pacific, including around Taiwan as we saw from our visit there-a bipartisan delegation including three members of this committee visited there in April.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter a statement from SubCom-a U.S. company based in New Hampshire that builds and maintains undersea cables-as well as a report from the International Connectivity Coalition for the record. [...] As we know, much of this infrastructure is privately owned and unevenly protected. Repair capacity is limited, and it takes time to fix breaks. So, attribution for attacks still takes weeks, and even then, intent is hard to prove. So, we need to recognize that that infrastructure is national security.

I am sure we are going to hear lots of good recommendations from our witnesses this morning about how we can impose costs when attribution is slow and intent is hard to prove, and what we should be doing in terms of ensuring the security of these undersea cables.

So again, thank you both for being here and I look forward to your testimony.

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