Convention on Nuclear Safety - Tenth Review Meeting, 13-24 April 2026

Convention on Nuclear Safety - Tenth Review Meeting, 13-24 April 2026

Written Statement on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and EURATOM. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

EURATOM and the above-mentioned States strongly condemn the Russian claim in its national report that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Russia's illegal seizure of Ukraine's ZNPP has no validity under international law but instead constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, in contradiction to the principles of the UN Charter, as stated inter alia in United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022. We urge Russia to immediately withdraw from the ZNPP and hand back full control to the Ukrainian nuclear safety regulator and other competent and legitimate authorities, in full respect of Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.
Moreover, EURATOM and the above-mentioned States condemn, in the strongest possible terms, that Russia has put nuclear safety at substantial risk, with effects in Ukraine and beyond, by its continued unlawful, unprovoked, and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine.
Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, targeting various on-site and off-site infrastructure that is critical for nuclear safety, pose grave threats to Ukraine's nuclear facilities as demonstrated by the illegal seizure of the ZNPP, where the Ukrainian nuclear safety regulator can no longer access the site and exercise direct regulatory oversight and where continued military activities have led to a significant deterioration of the plant's condition and overall nuclear safety situation. The drone strike on the

Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) in February 2025 is another case in point. These acts constitute gross violations of international law and run fundamentally contrary to the collective commitment of the Contracting Parties to strengthen the international nuclear safety framework including through full adherence to and implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States underline the importance of respecting the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during armed conflict, as outlined by the IAEA Director General. In particular, pillar 4 states that "there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites". Russia's persistent threats to Ukraine's nuclear facilities including through constant shelling of electrical substations and power lines supplying those nuclear facilities constitute a flagrant disregard for these indispensable pillars and substantially increases the risk of a nuclear accident with potentially severe consequences for Ukraine and impacts beyond.
It is clear that Russia's actions violate the objectives of the Convention on Nuclear Safety as laid down in Article 1, notably the obligation to "achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide".
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States will not recognise Russia's attempted illegal annexation of any part of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia region.
Due to Russia's military actions, the situation at the ZNPP remains extremely precarious. We remain concerned about any attempts to restart the units of the ZNPP. Such actions would also endanger nuclear safety given the absence of sufficient cooling water supplies, reliable off-site power and regular maintenance. All reactors at the ZNPP should remain in cold shutdown, as ordered by Ukraine's nuclear safety regulator and recommended by the IAEA.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States recognize the efforts of the Ukrainian national authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Convention, despite the extremely difficult circumstances under which they have to operate. We particularly commend the preparation of a comprehensive national report, as well as the active engagement in the review process with the submission of a large number of questions (276) to other Contracting Parties and the preparation of answers to the questions received.

EURATOM and the above-mentioned States consider that Russia's actions in Ukraine go against different articles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in the sense that Russia prevents Ukraine from:
• taking steps to maintain a system of regulatory inspection and assessment to govern the safety of nuclear installations, as per Article 7;
• ensuring that the national regulatory authority operates effectively and independently, as per Article 8;
• ensuring that the licence holder meets its prime responsibility for safety, as per Article 9;
• taking steps to ensure that due priority is given to nuclear safety in all activities, as per Article 10;
• ensuring that sufficient numbers of qualified staff are available for all safety-related activities in each nuclear installation, as per Article 11;
• taking into account the capabilities and limitations of human performance, as per Article 12;
• taking steps to ensure that the physical state and operation of nuclear installations continue to be in line with their design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions, as per Article 14;
• taking appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states exposure of workers and the public is kept as low as reasonably achievable and no individual is exposed to radiation doses exceeding the prescribed national limits, as per Article 15;
• taking appropriate steps so that on-site and off-site emergency plans are routinely tested and cover the activities to be carried out in case of an emergency, as per Article 16;
• ensuring that the operation, maintenance, inspection, and testing are conducted in accordance with approved procedures; that the necessary engineering and technical support is available; that operational limits and conditions are defined, and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for operation, as per Article 19.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States fully support the IAEA's work to assist Ukraine in ensuring, inter alia, nuclear safety. We commend the continued IAEA presence at the ZNPP and establishment of a continued presence of IAEA experts at all Ukraine's nuclear power plants and related electricity sub-stations important for nuclear safety. We underscore the

importance of preserving their access without limitation to the different facilities and ensuring a regular rotation of IAEA experts to all nuclear sites.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States recall the various statements issued by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) on the nuclear safety situation in Ukraine and align with its stance highlighting the importance of not compromising nuclear safety by any military aggression1.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States welcome the fact that this serious situation has been mentioned in the Summary Report.
EURATOM and the above-mentioned States stand firmly with Ukraine to support its implementation of commitments under the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

1 https://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/ensreg_statement_on_ukraine_0.pdf,
https://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/ensreg_statement_on_ukraine_6_march_2022_0.pdf,
https://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/ensreg_statement_on_ukraine_10_march_2022.pdf, ensreg_statement_on_ukraine_4_october_2022.pdf,
ensreg_statement_on_ukraine_24_november_2022.pdf.