09/02/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 09/02/2025 11:16
Photo: Fabio Murgia/CSIS, Getty Images
Commentary by Matthew P. Funaiole and Brian Hart
Published September 2, 2025
China is undertaking sweeping efforts to strengthen its military. Over the last few decades, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed from an outdated regional military into an increasingly advanced lethal force capable of operating well beyond China's borders. The PLA's modernization is far from complete and faces significant obstacles, but Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made it a top priority and is relentlessly pushing for progress.
China's emergence as an economic superpower has fueled decades of steady increases in military spending. Its official defense budget reached nearly $247 billion in 2025, but government figures understate actual expenditures. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates China's actual defense spending at about $318 billion in 2024, while another study places it even higher, at $471 billion. Whatever the exact figure, the scale and growth of China's defense budget have enabled broad investments in equipment, maintenance, personnel, and training.
China spends significantly less on defense than the United States, but the gap is shrinking. In 2012, China's defense spending was one-sixth that of the United States; by 2024 that figure had risen to one-third. In the Indo-Pacific, China towers over its neighbors, spending five times as much on defense as Japan and nearly seven times as much as South Korea-two key U.S. allies in the region.
Nowhere has the PLA's progress been more visible than its navy, which is evolving from a coastal force into a "blue-water navy" capable of projecting power globally. The PLA Navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in number of battle force ships around 2014 and is projected to continue growing over the next decade. China still trails the United States in key metrics, like overall ship tonnage, on-ship missile launchers, and experience operating in far seas. Yet China is catching up in these areas. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) assesses that China's ability to perform missions outside of the Indo-Pacific's first island chain is "modest but growing as it gains more experience."
Similar trends are underway in China's air forces. Today, the PLA Air Force and Navy field a significantly larger fleet of combat aircraft than in years past. Most importantly, a growing share of those aircraft are more technologically advanced. The PLA is steadily retiring older second- and third-generation fighters in favor of more modern 4.5-generation and fifth-generation aircraft, like the J-20 fighter, which boasts cutting-edge stealth and precision strike capabilities.
China's improving capabilities have significantly shifted the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait. Xi Jinping has ordered the military to be able to seize Taiwan by force by 2027, and Taiwan remains the PLA's top priority. A large share of PLA assets-especially naval and air assets-are concentrated within its Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, which would be most directly involved in any conflict over Taiwan.
The growth of China's nuclear arsenal has become one of the most alarming developments for Washington and its allies. According to estimates, China's nuclear stockpile reached 600 warheads in 2025, more than doubling since 2019. The DOD forecasts that China will continue to expand its nuclear arsenal to reach some 1,500 warheads by 2035. That would put China much closer to parity with the United States and Russia, forcing Washington to contend with not just one nuclear superpower, but two.
Beyond its expanding nuclear stockpile, the PLA Rocket Force has built up the world's largest arsenal of ground-based conventional and dual-use missiles. The number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles has grown particularly quickly with the fielding of the DF-26 missile. It has an estimated range of up to 4,000 kilometers, putting distant U.S. military bases in places like Guam within its reach and further complicating the security environment for U.S. allies like Japan.
In modern warfare, having terrestrial systems is no longer enough. Militaries rely heavily on constellations of satellites to collect intelligence, enable communications, and provide targeting and navigation. Xi has emphasized the importance of space for China, describing it as "an important strategic asset for the country." As of 2024, China had hundreds of military and dual-use satellites in orbit, lofted there by its rapidly advancing space program.
While the PLA is making gains in numerous areas, it has had to make cuts in some areas to enable upgrades in others. In 2015, Xi Jinping initiated unprecedented reforms to the organization of the entire PLA to speed up its modernization and enable joint operations. This included a reduction in forces of some 300,000 troops-nearly all of which came from the PLA Ground Force. Additional soldiers were moved to new support services, further reducing the Ground Force's size.
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Photo: Michael Kohler/CSIS
As Xi Jinping pushes to improve the PLA, he is running up against a significant and long-lasting problem: corruption. Since his early days in office, Xi has targeted the PLA with major anti-corruption campaigns, and he has intensified those efforts in recent years. Since 2023, two members of the powerful Central Military Commission have been purged, and one of the commission's vice chairmen, He Weidong, has disappeared. These and dozens of other senior-level purges demonstrate Xi's intent to root out obstacles to his ambitious modernization agenda.
How China would perform on the battlefield remains a major question. Having not fought a war in over four decades, the PLA is largely untested today. What is certain, however, is that China's leaders are serious about improving the country's military capabilities. The PLA has made rapid progress and is poised to continue to make major strides in the years to come.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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