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For the first time in more than a decade, the European Commisson's 2025 enlargement package radiates a sense of momentum, even hope. Commissioner Marta Kos spoke of a 'realistic possiiblity' for successful enlargement in the next few years, while HR/VP Kaja Kallas described it as both a 'political priority and a geopolitical investment'. Montenegro aims to conclude negotiations by the end of 2026, Albania by 2027, and Moldova and Ukraine by 2028, timelines that the Commission has openly endorsed. For the first time in years there is a sense that Brussels is excited about enlargement, while making it clear that momentum will not blur the distinctions among candidates or the rigour of the process.

Regrettably, this enthusiasm is not shared by all Member States. The long-awaited pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews on the EU's side, designed to assess how a larger Union would function and be financed, have been quietly deferred. Enlargement is back as a geopolitical necessity, yet it remains institutionally adrift, constrained by the absence of unanimous agreement among Member States to open accession talks with Ukraine, and by extension with Moldova, whose process remains tied to Kyiv's.

The EU must do its part to get ready. As candidates advance, so too must the EU: institutional adaptation, resource allocation and renewed public backing are the real tests ahead. Without such internal preparedness, enlargement risks stalling, and in cases like Ukraine, may never take off.

Winners, waiters and the rest

The 2025 enlargement package redraws the map of EU aspirants - not by geography, but by momentum. Some have turned promise into performance; others remain mired in political and institutional deadlock.

The credible four

Albania, Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine are the momentum-makers this year, translating reform commitments into measurable progress and backed by explicit timelines. As Commissioner Kos put it, 'these four candidates have matched their ambitions with concrete actions'. Among them, Montenegro stands out as the most advanced. It has delivered tangible results on reforms and remains, by the Commission's own assessment, the best-prepared country for EU membership. Four negotiation chapters have already been closed, with several more expected by year's end. The window for concluding negotiations by 2026 remains open, because Brussels still believes Podgorica can deliver.

Albania has made unprecedented progress, with five out of six negotiation clusters already open and the final one expected before the end of the year. The Commission recognises both the government's political commitment and the public's clear European aspirations. Its close alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including the 2024 Security and Defence Partnership and this year's inaugural dialogue in Tirana, underscores Albania's reliability as a partner. Persistent pressures on the judiciary and unresolved concerns about corruption, however, remain central issues for the Commission.

Moldova is this year's standout performer - the country that has made the most significant leap of all within a single reporting cycle. The Commission confirms that Chişinău has met the conditions to open three negotiation clusters: cluster 1 (Fundamentals), cluster 2 (Internal Market) and cluster 6 (External Relations), with the remaining clusters expected to meet the conditions before year's end. Moldova's alignment with the CFSP stands at 88%, revealing both a clear strategic orientation and the practical constraints of a country still investing concerted efforts into countering Russian malign influence and interference.

Ukraine remains the heartbeat of this enlargement cycle, the country that turned a war for survival into a reform agenda. Even as Russia's war of aggression grinds on, Kyiv continues to deliver on key legislative and institutional commitments. Yet concerns persist over the independence and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework, among other areas. For now, both Ukraine and Moldova remain stuck at the same gate - not because of what happens in Chişinău or Kyiv, but because the EU-27 cannot unanimously agree to proceed to opening the negotiation clusters. Their reform drive meets an all-too-familiar obstacle: hesitation within the Union. The challenge now is to sustain momentum amid internal EU divisions that risk slowing the process.

The waiting room

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo* and North Macedonia continue to struggle with political divisions, fragile institutions and unresolved disputes. Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress can, at best, be described as stalled. The country spent much of the past year paralysed by yet another political and institutional crisis, largely driven by the actions of the Republika Srpska entity, whose decisions ran counter to the EU agenda. The only positive development came at the eleventh hour, with the long-delayed Reform Agenda finally adopted end September 2025, after the European Commission withheld 10 % of indicative allocation under the Growth Plan. Before it can open accession talks or hold a first intergovernmental conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs what it still lacks most: a chief negotiator able to speak for the whole country with one voice. stalled. The country spent much of the past year paralysed by yet another political and institutional crisis, largely driven by the actions of the Republika Srpska entity whose attempts to undermine state authority and dismantle key judicial institutions ran counter to the EU agenda. The only positive development came at the eleventh hour, with the long-delayed Reform Agenda finally adopted at the end of September 2025, after the European Commission withheld 10 % of the country's indicative funding allocation under the Growth Plan. Before it can open accession talks or hold a first intergovernmental conference, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs what it still lacks most: a chief negotiator able to speak for the whole country with one voice.

Kosovo has seen no progress over the last year. Like Bosnia and Herzegovina, it remains trapped in political limbo, with a caretaker government still in place and the prospect of new elections looming. The European Commission's attempt to frame developments positively, citing the gradual lifting of restrictive measures and local elections in the north, feels more symbolic than substantive. Meanwhile, the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue remained effectively frozen through the reporting period, despite formal claims to the contrary.

North Macedonia's choice remains clear. This is reflected in its full alignment with the CFSP and active contributions to the common security and defence policy (CSDP). Yet one obstacle continues to overshadow its European progress. As citizens grow disillusioned with a process that feels increasingly distant, the Commission notes that 'no attempts were made to adopt the relevant constitutional changes' outlined in the Council Conclusions of 18 July 2022, which North Macedonia committed to launch and finalise. These amendments, meant to recognise all citizens living within its borders, including Bulgarians, remain key to advancing EU-related reforms beyond the Reform Agenda and to restoring faith that accession remains within reach.

The paradox

Serbia continues to proclaim EU membership as its key strategic goal while steadily moving in the opposite direction. The 2025 progress report notes unprecedented levels of 'no progress' as well as backsliding on freedom of expression and media independence. It also flags the persistence of an anti-EU narrative across major media outlets, including from Serbia's own political leadership. With demonstrations ongoing for more than a year, the mood in Brussels has shifted from cautious engagement to growing frustration. The EU's message is clear: alignment with the CFSP is not optional - Serbia must demonstrate genuine geopolitical commitment. After all, this is no ordinary enlargement round but one in which geopolitical credibility now counts as much as merit-based reform.

The outsiders

Georgia and Türkiye both remain outside the current enlargement momentum, albeit for very different reasons - Georgia has veered off course amid an abrupt and worrying political regression, and Türkiye remains trapped in long-term limbo. In Georgia, the situation has sharply deteriorated, marked by democratic backsliding and severe restrictions on fundamental rights. The European Council effectively halted the accession process in June 2024. Meanwhile, accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018. The European Commission now speaks of Ankara less as a candidate and more as a partner, emphasising shared strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Western Balkans and the Black Sea, alongside cooperation on energy and connectivity.

The next frontier of enlargement

There is a welcome level of energy in this year's 2025 enlargement package. Brussels is engaging more proactively with frontrunners and, crucially, with EU Member States to turn political will into tangible progress. The Commission has endorsed timelines but talk of smooth ratifications may prove premature. The support by existing EU Member States remains crucial and in some cases lacking. Croatia's accession protocol took around eighteen months to ratify; in today's Europe - more fragmented and polarised than a decade ago - such unanimity will be far harder to achieve. Across the Union, anti-enlargement voices are growing louder, from parliamentary chambers to referendum debates, and the political landscape across the EU has shifted profoundly. The major challenge ahead lies not only in preparing candidates, but in re-engaging the Union itself: building a strategy for ratifying accession treaties and making the case for enlargement to ever-more sceptical publics. This is where the forthcoming pre-enlargement reforms policy reviews must deliver - by anticipating the internal reforms, financial adjustments, and institutional changes that will make a larger EU governable.

*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

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• Western Balkans
• EU enlargement
• EU Foreign Policy